We study definability of second-order generalized quantifiers. We show that the question whether a second-order generalized quantifier Q 1 is definable in terms of another quantifier Q 2 , the base logic being monadic second-order logic, reduces to the question if a quantifier Q 1 is definable in FO(Q 2 , <, +, ×) for certain first-order quantifiers Q 1 and Q 2 . We use our characterization to show new definability and non-definability results for second-order generalized quantifiers. We also show that the monadic second-order majority quantifier Most 1 is not definable in second-order logic.
Introduction
The notion of generalized quantifier goes back to Mostowski [1] and Lindström [2] . Generalized quantifiers were first mainly studied in the framework of model theory. The study of generalized quantifiers extended to the context of finite model theory via applications to descriptive complexity theory. We refer to [3] and [4] for surveys of first-order generalized quantifiers in finite model theory. Generalized quantifiers have been also extensively studied in the formal semantics of natural language (see [5] for a survey).
The study of second-order generalized quantifiers is a relatively new and unexplored area in finite model theory. On the other hand, second-order logic (SO) and its many fragments have been studied extensively starting from Fagin's characterization of NP in terms of existential second-order logic [6] . Second-order generalized quantifiers were first studied in the context of finite structures by Burtschick and Vollmer [7] . Shortly after, Andersson [8] studied the expressive power of families of second-order generalized quantifiers determined by the syntactic types of quantifiers. In [9] [10] [11] Kontinen studied definability questions of second-order generalized quantifiers. In the case of first-order quantifiers, definability of a quantifier Q in a logic L means that the class of structures, used to interpret Q , is axiomatizable in L. In the second-order case, the analogous concept of definability was formulated in [9, 10] . In this article, we give a computationally motivated characterization for the notion of definability of second-order generalized quantifiers. Burtschick and Vollmer [7] noticed that second-order generalized quantifiers can be used to logically characterize complexity classes defined in terms of so-called Leaf Languages. The leaf languages approach in computational complexity theory, introduced by Bovet, Crescenzi, and Silvestri [12] , is a unifying approach to define complexity classes. The central idea behind this approach is to generalize the conditions under which, e.g., a Turing machine or an automaton accepts its input. Many complexity classes can be defined in this context in terms of suitable leaf languages. On the other hand, a complexity class defined in terms of a leaf language B can be under certain conditions characterized logically by a logic of the form:
where Q B is a second-order generalized quantifier corresponding to the language B. In the context of leaf languages, polynomial time non-deterministic Turing machines can be sometimes replaced by non-deterministic finite automata (so-called finite leaf automata) without a significant decrease in complexity [13] . Galota and Vollmer [14] showed that complexity classes defined by finite leaf automata can be logically characterized in terms of monadic second-order generalized quantifiers. This result nicely extends the well known [15] [16] [17] characterization of regular languages in terms of monadic second-order logic (MSO).
The definability theory of second-order generalized quantifiers has some similarities and differences compared to that of first-order generalized quantifiers. For example, it was observed in [9] that the binary second-order existential quantifier cannot be defined in terms of any monadic second-order generalized quantifiers. This result is in contrast with the fact (a corollary of a result of Andersson [8] ) that all classes of finite first-order structures are already definable in terms of monadic second-order generalized quantifiers.
In this paper we prove a general result characterizing the question when a quantifier Q is definable in MSO(Q , +), where + denotes the built-in addition relation. We assume the built-in addition in order to unleash the expressive power embodied by MSO. Recall that, while MSO corresponds to regular languages over strings, MSO(+) corresponds to the linear fragment of the polynomial hierarchy (LINH) on strings [18] . Some of our results can be generalized to the case where the base logic is full second-order logic instead of MSO(+). Our characterization is based on the idea connecting oracle separation results with lower bound results for small constant depth circuits, see e.g., [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] . We show that a second-order generalized quantifier Q 1 is definable in the logic MSO(Q 2 , +) iff for certain first-order encodings Q i of Q i , Q 1 is definable in FO(Q 2 , +, ×). It is worth noting that the latter condition implies that Q 1 is AC 0 (Turing) reducible to Q 2 . We use our characterization to show new definability and non-definability results for second-order generalized quantifiers. In particular, we show that the monadic second-order majority quantifier Most 1 is not definable in second-order logic. This answers
the question left open in [24] (see also [25] ), where second-order generalized quantifiers were used to model collective quantification in natural language, for example:
1. Most girls gathered. 2. All soldiers surrounded the Alamo.
The common strategy in formalizing collective quantification has been to define the meanings of collective determiners, quantifying over collections, using certain type-shifting operations. These operations, i.e., lifts, define the collective interpretations of determiners systematically from the standard meanings of quantifiers (see, e.g., [26, 27] ). In [24] we show that all these lifts are definable in second-order logic. In this paper we prove that some collective quantifiers (second-order generalized quantifiers) are not definable in second-order logic. Therefore, there is no second-order definable lift expressing their collective meaning. This is clearly a restriction of the type-shifting approach. One possible alternative would be to use second-order generalized quantifiers in the study of collective semantics, as we already proposed in [24] . However, as it follows from this paper the computational complexity of such approach is excessive and hence it may not be a plausible model of collective quantification in natural language (see [28] [29] [30] for a discussion of computational restrictions in natural language semantics). Hence, it may be wise to turn in the direction of another well-known way of studying collective quantification in natural language, the many-sorted (algebraic) tradition (see [31] ). Another linguistic interpretation of our results might be that computational complexity restricts the expressive power of everyday language (see [32] ). Namely, even though natural language can in principle realize collective quantifiers non-definable in second-order logic, its everyday fragment does not contain such constructions due to their high complexity.
Preliminaries
In this article all structures are assumed to be finite. The universe of a structure A is denoted by A. Without loss of generality, we may assume that A is always of the form {0, . . . ,m} for some m ∈ N. For a logic L, the set of τ -formulas of L is denoted by L[τ ]. If φ is a τ -sentence, then the class of τ -models of φ is denoted by Mod(φ). A class K of τ -models is said to be axiomatizable in a logic L, Sometimes we assume that our structures (and logics) are equipped with auxiliary built-in relations. In addition to the built-in ordering <, which is interpreted naturally, we also use the ternary relations + and ×. The relations + and × are defined as
The relation BIT is a further important relation which is defined by: BIT(a, j) holds iff the bit of order 2 j is 1 in the binary representation bin(a) of a. The presence of built-in relations is signaled, e.g., by the notation FO(<). It is well known that FO(<, +, ×) ≡ FO(<, BIT) (see [33] ). Note that < is easily definable in FO(+) and hence, in the presence of +, we sometimes do not mention < explicitly.
We assume that the reader is familiar with the basics of computational complexity theory. Below, we recall certain results from descriptive complexity theory. It is instructive to note that many of the logics considered in this article correspond to interesting complexity classes. We mention first the logic FO(<, +, ×) which corresponds exactly to the so-called logarithmic hierarchy (LH). This class is the logarithmic analogue of the polynomial hierarchy (PH), corresponding to SO [34] , defined in terms of alternating Turing machines (ATM) running in polynomial time with O (1) alternations. In between LH and PH we have the linear hierarchy (LINH) corresponding to the logic MSO(+) over strings [18] .
In this article also majority quantifiers are discussed and studied. It is well-known that majority quantifiers can be used to logically characterize counting computations. The following counting hierarchies are relevant for this article: the logarithmic counting hierarchy (LCH), the linear counting hierarchy (LINCH), and the (polynomial) counting hierarchy (CH) all of which can be defined, with analogous resource bounds as LH, LINH, and PH, in terms of so-called Threshold Turing machines [35] . On the logical side, majority quantifiers (defined in Section 2.1) can be used to provide logical counterparts for these classes: FO(M, +, ×) ≡ LCH [36] , FO(Most 1 , <) ≡ LINCH (over strings) [37] , and FO(Most k ) k∈N * ≡ CH [38] . Furthermore, in circuit complexity, it is known that LH corresponds exactly to DLOGTIME-uniform AC 0 and LCH to DLOGTIME-uniform TC 0 [36] . Also, DLOGTIME-uniform AC 
Generalized quantifiers
In this section we briefly recall some basics of generalized quantifiers.
Let τ = {P 1 , . . . , P r } be a relational vocabulary, where P i is l i -ary for 1 i r, and Q a class of τ -structures closed under isomorphisms. The class Q gives rise to a generalized quantifier which we also denote by Q . The tuple
is the type of the quantifier Q . 
2. The satisfaction relation of FO is extended by the rule:
We say that a quantifier Q is definable in a logic L if the class Q is axiomatizable in L. Note that Q is trivially definable in FO(Q ). If L has the substitution property and is closed under FO-operations, then definability of Q in L implies that FO(Q ) L. So, among such logics, FO(Q ) is the minimal logic in which Q is definable.
Example 2.2.
The following quantifiers will be discussed in the sections to come. Suppose S ⊆ N and k ∈ N.
If S is of the form {kn | n ∈ N} for some k ∈ N, we denote Q S by D k .
We will also refer to the vectorizations of the quantifiers D k and M later. The nth vectorization of D k is the following quantifier ) is a tuple of positive integers for 1 i w. A second-order structure of type t is a structure of the form (A, P 1 , . . . , P w ), where 
Analogously to the first-order case, if S is of the form {kn | n ∈ N} for some k ∈ N, we denote Q S by D k .
The first example is the familiar k-ary second-order existential quantifier. The quantifier Even says that a formula holds for an even number of subsets of the universe. On the other hand, the quantifier Even says that all the subsets satisfying a formula have an even cardinality. The quantifier Most k is the k-ary second-order version of M expressing that a formula holds for more than half of the k-ary relations. 
is a formula. 2. Satisfaction relation of FO is extended by the rule:
Definability
Recall that a first-order generalized quantifier Q is definable in a logic L if the class Q is axiomatizable in L. This condition can be reformulated as follows assuming L has the substitution property:
Proposition 2.6. A first-order quantifier Q is definable in a logic L if and only if L ≡ L(Q ).
How do we formalize definability for second-order quantifiers? Intuitively, e.g., the monadic second-order existential quantifier ∃ 
so the problem is to find a way to express the non-emptiness of this collection in a way which does not depend on the particular formula ψ(X). This was formalized in [10] L(G 1 , . . . , G w ) are of the form A = (A, G 1 , . . . , G w ) , where A is a first-order model and
3. The quantifiers G i are interpreted using the relations G i :
Mod(φ) = (A, G 1 , . . . , G w ) (A, G 1 , . 
The following was shown in [10] : Definability questions of second-order quantifiers have been studied in [10, 11, 38] . We recall the following results. Theorem 2.11 is proved with respect to a natural ordering of the types of second-order generalized quantifiers. Theorem 2.11 is existential in nature and does not give us a concrete non-definable quantifier. It was observed in [9] that it is not so difficult to find concrete quantifiers which cannot be defined using any monadic quantifiers.
Denote by Q the collection of all monadic second-order generalized quantifiers. [9] .) The quantifier ∃ 2 2 is not definable in FO(Q).
Theorem 2.12. (See
It is worth noting that the logic FO(Q) is capable of defining all classes of first-order structures (cf. Theorem 6.2 in [8] ). Finally, we recall the following result about second-order majority quantifiers: Theorem 2.13. (See [38] .
It interesting to note that definability of Most 1 in the logic SO would imply that PH ≡ CH in computational complexity.
This observation was discussed in [24, 25] . In this paper we show that the quantifier Most 1 is not definable in SO, but, analogously to Theorem 2.10, this non-definability result does not imply that PH CH.
Characterizing definability
The computational analogue of a first-order generalized quantifier is the notion of an oracle (see [33] ). Let Q be a quantifier of vocabulary τ and L a logic. The idea is that in L(Q ) we can query "without a cost" if a definable τ -structure
A is a member of the class Q . Recall that a second-order generalized quantifier Q of type ( (1)) is definable, e.g., in SO if there is a sentence φ ∈ SO(G) such that for all second-order structures (A, G):
It is not immediately clear how to view this notion in computational terms. The set G corresponds to a local first-order quantifier and, if we treat G as an oracle, then in (1) we are in fact trying to define a property oracles. One way to proceed is to formalize definability of a quantifier Q in terms of oracle Turing machines that treat (a suitable initial segment) the oracle as part of the input. However, in this article we do not follow that idea as there is a more familiar route to take. An important observation here is that the set G can be of exponential size compared to the domain A. This observation can be used to show that SO-definability of Q reduces to logarithmic time definability.
Our result is a logical version of the results connecting oracle separation results with lower bound results for small constant depth circuits, see e.g., [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] . For example, in [22] , Torán studied oracle separations in the counting hierarchy and noticed that there is essentially no difference between an oracle Turing machine writing an oracle query on its query tape and a logarithmic time Turing machine writing an address on its random access tape. He used this analogy to show that an oracle separation result for classes in the polynomial counting hierarchy implies a real separation for the corresponding classes in the logarithmic counting hierarchy LINCH (equivalently in DLOGTIMEuniform TC 0 ).
We use a logical version of this idea: we show that SO and the relation G in (1) can be replaced by FO and a unary relation P by passing from A to a domain of cardinality 2 |A| .
In this section we mainly restrict attention to monadic second-order generalized quantifiers. We interpret definability of second-order quantifiers in MSO(+) in the natural way: for example, a second-order quantifier Q of type ( (1) 
. ,n − 1} and G i ⊆ P(A) × · · · × P(A).
Denote byÂ = (B, P 1 , . . . , P w ) the following first-order structure of vocabulary τ = {P 1 , . . . , P w }, where P i is an r i -ary predicate, and
where, for 1 k r i , the length-n binary representation of j k is given by s 0 · · · s n−1 , and
For a quantifier Q of type t, we denote by Q the first-order quantifier of vocabulary τ defined by Q := {Â: A ∈ Q}.
It is easy to see that the quantifier Q has only structures in cardinalities of the form 2 n and that |G i | = |P i | for 1 i w. Note also that the quantifier Q encoding Q may depend on the ordering of the domain B and hence does not strictly speaking correspond to a Lindström quantifier of vocabulary τ but a τ -quantifier with build-in arithmetic relations (quantifiers defined and studied in [39] ). On the other hand, for the numerical quantifiers Q discussed in the rest of this section, the first-order encodings Q are obviously order invariant and hence correspond to Lindström quantifiers of vocabulary τ . We are now ready for the main result of this article. ((1, 1) ) and ( (1), (1)), respectively.
Let us first assume that Q 1 is definable in the logic MSO(Q 2 , +). Then there is a sentence φ ∈ MSO(Q 2 , G, +) such that for all structures (A, +, G)
We shall next show that there is a sentence φ * ∈ FO(Q 2 +, ×)[{P }], where P is binary, such that for all structures A = (A, G):
where (B, P ) =Â (see Definition 3.1). We define φ * via the following translation, where x i and Y i denote the first-order and the unary predicate variables appearing in the formulas of MSO(Q 2 , G, +).
It is now straightforward to show that for all formulas ψ ∈ MSO(Q 2 , G, +), structures (A, G), and assignments s
where the assignment s * is defined such that s * (x i ) = s(x i ) for all first-order variables x i , and, if s(
In the formula translation, we use the predicate BIT, which is FO(+, ×)-definable, to recover the set D from the integer d.
By the above translation, the sentence ∃n |B| = 2 n ∧ φ * of the logic FO(Q 2 , +, ×) now defines the quantifier Q 1 . Let us then show the converse implication. Assume that φ ∈ FO(Q 2 , +, ×) defines the quantifier Q 1 . The idea is now to translate φ ∈ FO(Q 2 , +, ×) to φ ∈ MSO(Q 2 , G, +) such that for all A = (A, G):
Analogously to the first translation, we encode integers in the domain B = {0, . . . , 2 n − 1} in terms of subsets X ⊆ {0, . . . ,n − 1}. We use the following formulas X = Y , X < Y , X + Y = Z , and X × Y = Z expressing arithmetic operations on binary numbers. The first three formulas are FO(+)-expressible, and the fourth is expressible in the logic FO(M, +, ×) MSO(+) [40] . The translation φ φ is now defined as follows.
It is straightforward to show that this translation works as intended. In particular, it follows that the sentence φ ∈ MSO(Q 2 , G, +) now defines the quantifier Q 1 . 2
Let us then discuss some corollaries of Theorem 3.2. We need the following definition. = (s 1 , . . . , s w ) and τ be as in Definition 3.1. Let Q be a quantifier of type t. The quantifier Q is numerical if there is a relation T ⊆ N w such that for all t-structures (A,
We denote Q by Q T and by Q T the first-order numerical quantifier (defined analogously) of vocabulary τ .
It is easy to see that, for a numerical Q T , the quantifier Q T (see Definition 3.1) is just the restriction of the corresponding first-order quantifier Q T to the cardinalities 2 n :
This observation allows us to show the following:
Theorem 3.4. Let Q T be a numerical quantifier and k ∈ N. Then
Proof. 
Recall that the quantifiers Q T and D k are the restrictions of the quantifiers Q T and D k to cardinalities of the form 2 n , respectively. Let us first note that (a) is equivalent with 
Since the quantifier Q T contains structures only in cardinalities of the form 2 n it is easy to see that ψ ∈ FO(D k , +, ×) also defines Q T .
It now suffices to show that (b) and (c) are equivalent. Note first that (b) ⇒ (c) can be easily proved using the predicate x = 2 y . We will show (c) ⇒ (b). Here we use the fact that the logic FO(D k , +, ×) is closed under logical reductions. We will define Q T (over all cardinalities) with the help of the quantifier Q T . Let A be a structure. If |A| = 2 n for some n ∈ N, then A ∈ Q T can be expressed in terms of the quantifier Q T . Note that even if |A| is not a power of two, it holds that the least m such that |A| 2 m satisfies 2 m 2| A|.
We will now sketch how the quantifier Q T can be defined in terms of Q T . Assume φ ∈ FO(D k , +, ×) is a sentence defining Q T . Let A = (A, P 1 , . . . , P w ) be a τ -structure, where A = {0, . . . ,n − 1}. We use the following facts:
1. There is a FO(<, +, ×)-definable query F that maps A to the structure F (A) which is isomorphic to 0, . . . ,
where 2 m is the least power of two satisfying n 2 m .
2. There is a sentence ψ ∈ FO(D k , +, ×) such that for all A:
Since Q T is numerical, the sentence ψ now defines Q T . The query F is easily definable in FO(<, +, ×); the domain of [33] for more on first-order queries). The sentence ψ is constructed inductively (see e.g., Section 3.2 [33] ) using, in particular, the fact that the second vector- The following lemma can be now used. . This is a contradiction with the results of [20] and [21] showing that such a quasi-polynomial size family (C 2 n ) n∈N cannot exist. 2
Conclusion
We have shown that definability of second-order generalized quantifiers can be reduced to definability of first-order generalized quantifiers. We have indicated a couple of corollaries to our characterization but surely there is more to be done here, e.g., with replacing the base logic MSO(+) by SO as in Theorem 3.8. In particular, Theorem 3.8 solves the open problem proposed in [24, 25] , where we studied the collective meanings of natural language quantifiers. It suggests, as we argued in [24] , that the type-shifting strategy [27] to define the meanings of natural language quantification might be too restricted in its computational power. It is likely that second-order logic is not enough to capture natural language semantics. Another interpretation would be that everyday language does not realize hard collective quantifiers (for sure they are marginal at best) due to their complexity.
